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S. B. 284: AMENDMENT TO OHIO'S ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION VERIFIED COMPLAINT LAW

In May of 1980, the 113th Ohio General Assembly enacted Senate
Bill 284 to amend section 3745.08 of the Ohio Revised Code.' The purpose of the enactment is stated to be clarification of procedures util-

ized for filing and resolving complaints of alleged violations of specific
pollution control laws.' The bill was enacted in response to the recom-4
mendation 3 of the Ohio Environmental Protection Agency (OEPA)
that changes and clarification of procedures regarding verified complaints were necessary.'
Of particular concern to the OEPA was the exercise of hearing
rights as a dilatory tactic by persons charged in a complaint.' The

OEPA asserts that a hearing requirement prior to an order becoming
effective permits the alleged pollution danger to continue unabated until an adjudicatory hearing is concluded. The OEPA also takes the
position that when a hearing before the agency is demanded by

everyone affected by verified complaints, the entire environmental
regulatory system is stultified.' The General Assembly responded to
1. Am. S.B. 284, 113th General Assembly (1980) (codified in OHIO REV. CODE
§ 3745.08 (Page Supp. 1980) (effective Aug. 7, 1980)).
2. The bill's enacting clause states: "An Act ... to amend section 3745.08 of the
Revised Code to clarify procedure for resolution of complaints by public officials and
persons allegedly aggrieved or adversely affected by a violation of pollution control
law."
3. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3745.01(F) (Page 1980). This section permits the
Director of the OEPA to make recommendations to the General Assembly for legislation he considers appropriate to carrying out his duties or in the accomplishment of the
legislative purpose in creating the OEPA, supra note 1.
4. When the Ohio General Assembly created the OEPA in 1972, it intended that
the agency be a unified anti-pollution authority with broad powers to prevent as well as
abate pollution of the environment. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3745.011(B), (F) (Page
Supp. 1980).
5. Interview with Patterson Pepple and Sidney Stein, OEPA Legislative Liaison
and Assistant to the OEPA Legal Advisor, respectively (Sept. 14, 1980) [hereinafter
cited as Interview with OEPA Legislative Liaison]. Mr. Pepple contacted Senator Kenneth R. Cox regarding the proposed amendment. Senator Cox subsequently introduced
S.B. 284 in the Senate on Sept. 20, 1979. On Feb. 21, 1980, it was reported by the
Senate Committee on Agriculture, Conservation, and Environment [hereinafter cited
as Senate Comm.] and passed ih the Senate on Feb. 28, 1980. The House Energy and
Environment Committee reported S.B. 284 on April 16, 1980 and subsequently
enacted it on May 7, 1980. The bill became effective on Aug. 7, 1980.
6. Memorandum to Senate Committee from OEPA Legal Advisor Mark Stenga
(Jan. 30, 1980) [hereinafter cited as memorandum from OEPA Legal Advisor to
Senate Comm.) (Copy on file in the Ohio Legislative Service Commission Library).
7. Id.
ANN.

8. Id.
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these concerns by enacting S.B. 284. Principally, the bill eliminates the
former requirement that the director convene a hearing prior to entering an operative order in response to a verified complaint. 9 In its place,
the General Assembly has granted to the director discretion in deciding
whether to conduct a hearing upon receipt of a verified complaint. Objection to this change stems from the constitutional due process requirement that adequate notice and opportunity to be heard must be
afforded a party prior to adversely affecting such person's constitutionally protected "property" interest."0
The following analysis of S.B. 284 will begin with a discussion of
the statutory framework, including the scope of complaints and the required verification procedures before a complaint may properly be filed. Next, the procedure for handling and resolving a complaint once
filed with the OEPA will be analyzed. Finally, the legislative grant of
discretion to the director in convening a hearing will be discussed,
along with its effect on the issue whether the administrative procedures
provided for in S.B. 284 are constitutionally sufficient.'
II.
A.

ANALYSIS

The Statutory Scheme

Senate Bill 284 provides that an alleged violation of any rule, law,
standard, order, license, permit, or variance the OEPA administers
with regard to water pollution, air pollution, solid waste, public water
supply, or hazardous waste is a proper subject of a complaint." Once
the alleged violation is within the scope of a verified complaint, S.B.
284 permits an officer of a state agency or political subdivision, or any
person allegedly aggrieved or affected by an alleged violation which
has occurred, is occurring, or will occur, to file a complaint with the
9. OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 3745.08 (Page 1980) (repealed and amended 1980).
10. U.S. CONST. Amend. XIV § 1. Constitutional due process under the fourteenth amendment requires that state governments provide notice and a hearing before
taking action which deprives an individual of "liberty" or "property." See, e.g.,
Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972). For a discussion of what constitutes a

"property" interest, see notes 40-46 and accompanying text infra.

11. Specifically, the procedure to be focused upon is the "conference" which has
replaced the hearing as a required proceeding, See notes 54-56 and accompanying text
infra.
12. OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 3745.08(A) (Page Supp. 1980). Violations of laws
relating to public water supply and hazardous wastes were added by S.B. 284 to the
scope of alleged violations which may prompt the filing of a complaint. These addi-

tions allow for expanded public participation in the environmental regulatory area.

Under prior law citizens were precluded from filing complaints on these subjects. See

Letter from Ohio League of Women Voters to Daniel Bernardin (Nov. 21, 1980) (on
file with the University of Dayton Law Review office).
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol6/iss2/11
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director of OEPA.' 3 The complaint must be in writing, verified by the

affidavit of the complainant, his agent, or attorney." The verification

procedure requires that the affidavit be sworn to and signed before
"any person authorized by law to administer oaths." 5 The complaint
must allege that another person has violated, is violating, or will
violate any rule, law, standard, order, license, permit, or variance

which is a proper subject for a verified complaint." If the alleged
violator is in possession of a valid license, permit, variance, or plan approval relating to a proper subject of a verified complaint, the complaint must allege that the person has violated, is violating, or will
violate the conditions of that license, permit, variance, or plan approval.' 7
Once a complaint is properly filed with the OEPA, S.B. 284 requires the director to initiate a "prompt investigation" into the allegation." The investigation is to be conducted "such as is reasonably
13. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3745.08(A) (Page Supp. 1980). Prior to S.B. 284, the
statute read: "An officer of an agency of the state or of a political subdivision ... or
any person allegedly aggrieved or adversely affected by an alleged violation may file a
verified complaint. . . ." This language was deemed troublesome since it tended to be
interpreted to mean that a violation had to have occurred before a complaint could be
filed. Interview with OEPA Legislative Liaison, supra note 5. Senate Bill 284 specifies
that any alleged violation of a pollution control law within the scope of the section that
has occurred, is occurring, or will occur is a proper subject for a verified complaint.
14. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 3745.08(A) (Page Supp. 1980). Before the enactment
of S.B. 284, the statute simply used the term "verified complaint" without detailing
procedures necessary to verify a complaint filed with the OEPA.
Senate Bill 284 requires that a complaint be written and verified by the affidavit of
the complainant, his agent, or attorney... made before any person authorized by
law to administer oaths and must be signed by the person who makes it. The person before whom it was taken shall certify that it was sworn to before him and
signed in his presence, and his certificate signed officially by him shall be evidence
that the affidavit was made, that the name of the person was written by himself
and that he was such person.
15. Id. Senate Bill 284 changes the definition of "verified complaint" in OHIO
AD. CODE § 3745-47-03(0) (Baldwin 1980) (formerly EP-40-03(O)), as applied to the
OEPA, from a complaint "sworn to by the complainant before a notary public" to
one "made before any person authorized by law to administer oaths." This change
was criticized by the Ohio League of Women Voters as creating confusion since a
notary public is well recognized by the public as a proper agent for verifying a complaint and therefore there was no need for the change. Ohio League of Women Voters
memorandum to OEPA Legislative Liaison, Patterson Pepple (Aug. 6, 1979)
[hereinafter cited as Ohio League of Women Voters Memorandum] (copy on file in the
Ohio Legislative Service Commission Library). This criticism is unwarranted. The
change is beneficial since it expands the number of persons before whom an affidavit
may be sworn, facilitating the complaint filing procedure.
16. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 3745.08(A) (Page Supp. 1980).
17. Id. Senate Bill 284 adds violations of conditions of a plan approval to the list
of alleged violations which may prompt the filing of a complaint.
18. Id. § 3745.08(B). There is no legislative indication of just how prompt a
"prompt investigation" must be. One OEPA official interprets the phrase to require
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necessary" 9 to determine whether an alleged violation has occurred, is
occurring, or will occur.2" Senate Bill 284 raises the standard of a violation finding by the director from "probable cause to believe a violation
has or will occur" under the old statute," to an affirmative finding
that an alleged violation has occurred, is occuring, or will occur." As
part of the investigation, the director is required to discuss the complaint with both the complaintant and the alleged violator, 3 in the
4
hope that a resolution may be reached easily.
Upon conclusion of the investigation, the director has plenary
power to exercise one of several options. If the investigation reveals
that a violation has occurred, is occurring, or will occur, the director
,
2may,5
(1)

"enter such order

6

as may be necessary,""'

that an investigation be conducted as soon as reasonably possible after receipt of a
complaint by the OEPA. Interview with Charles Forsthoff, OEPA Southwestern
District Office Chief (Feb. 23, 1981) [hereinafter cited as Interview with Southwestern
District Office Chief].
19. The Ohio League of Women Voters criticized this as weak statutory language
which could be interpreted as a reason for not conducting an investigation. Ohio
League of Women Voters memorandum, supra note 15. The OEPA favors this change
since very often an alleged violator is aware of the problem and is taking steps to abate
it. In these situations a required thorough investigation is useless. Interview with
Southwestern District Office Chief, supra note 18.
20. OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 3745.08(B) (Page Supp. 1980). See note 13 supra.
21.

OHIO REv. CODE ANN.

§ 3745.08 (Page 1980) (repealed and amended 1980).

22. Id. § 3745.08(B) (Page Supp. 1980). This language was recommended by the
Ohio Manufacturers' Association (OMA). The original language of S.B. 284 § I(B)
read: "If the Director does not determine that a violation, has occurred, is occurring,
or will occur, he shall dismiss the complaint." The OMA objected that "it is overly
burdensome for an entity to be subject to the sanctions authorized in this bill if a finding of a violation cannot be found .... Our change would merely require dismissal of
a complaint when no finding is possible." Memorandum from attorney John W.
Hoberg to Ohio Manufacturers' Ass'n (July 23, 1979) [hereinafter cited as Ohio
Manufacturers' Ass'n Memorandum] (copy on file in the Ohio Legislative Services
Commission Library).
23.

OHIO REv. CODE ANN.

§ 3745.08(B) (Page Supp. 1980).

24. Interview with OEPA Legislative Liaison, supra note 5.
25. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3745.08(B) (Page Supp. 1980). The Ohio League of
Women Voters objected to the use of the word "may" in regard to options available
to the director. It proposed the word "shall" replace it because, as S.B. 284 is written,
even if the director determines that a violation exists, he is not legally required to do
anything at all. Ohio League of Women Voters Memorandum, supra note 15.
26. An order may be of two types: (1) an "abatement" order and (2) a "consent
agreement." Interview with OEPA Southwestern District Office Chief, supra note 18.
An "abatement" order is defined as the reduction in the degree or the intensity of
pollution. 0. FRICK, ENVIORNMENTAL GLOSSARY (1980). A "consent agreement" consists of any written document containing stipulations of fact; conclusions regarding

material issues of law, fact, or discretion; and a specified proposed penalty or proposed revocation or suspension acceptable to both the OEPA and the alleged violator. Id.
27. OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 3745.08(B) (Page Supp. 1980). Prior to S.B. 284, the
statute required the director either to convene a hearing and enter such order as may be
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol6/iss2/11
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(2) "request the Ohio Attorney General to initiate appropriate

"s
legal proceedings" against the alleged violator, or
(3) dismiss the complaint "where he determines that prior violations have been terminated and that future violations of the
same kind are unlikely to occur . ..."'9
If the director does not convene a hearing prior to entering any
operative order, he must provide an opportunity to the complainant
and the alleged violator to attend a "conference" with the director or
his delegate concerning the alleged violation.3 °
When the director is unable to determine that an alleged violation
has occurred, is occurring, or will occur, S.B. 284 requires him to
dismiss the complaint."' The original language of S.B. 284 allowed the
director to dismiss a complaint only upon his affirmative finding of no
violation.32 One group objected that such a requirement for dismissal
would be unfair to a party named in a complaint if a violation could
not be found." The argument is that a dismissal under these circumstances would not work against the OEPA or any third party with
respect to other violations which could be shown. 3 4
Although various minor objections have been raised concerning
S.B. 284," this note's principal focus is on the bill's failure to assure
that no party will unconstitutionally be deprived of a property interest

necessary, or contact the Attorney General for appropriate legal proceedings. Senate
Bill 284 grants sole discretion to the director in convening a hearing prior to an order
becoming effective. See notes 6-10 and accompanying text supra.
28. Id.
29. Id. The OEPA favors this provision since past experience has shown that the
charged violator was often aware of the violation and was taking steps to abate it. Interview with Southwestern District Office Chief, supra note 18.
30.

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3745.08(B) (Page Supp. 1980). Senate Bill 284 also

clarifies the procedure to be utilized should the director decide to convene a hearing
prior to entry of an operative abatement order. The requirement that the director
publish notice in a newspaper of general circulation in the county of the alleged violation twenty days before any hearing is unchanged from prior law. The enactment requires the director to mail written notice by certified mail, return receipt requested, to
the complainant as well as the alleged violator. Id. § 3745.08(C). S.B. 284 further requires that the OEPA and the alleged violator be parties to any adjudicatory hearing
initiated by a verified complaint. The complainant may participate by providing written notice of intention to participate any time before the hearing date. Any other person may participate at the discretion of the director by filing a motion to intervene. Id.
§ 3745.08(C). Finally, S.B. 284 provides that a verified complaint may be consolidated
with another verified complaint or independent finding of the director where he determines that a consolidation will facilitate enforcement of any law the OEPA administers
and one of more issues of fact or law are in common. Id. § 3745.08(D).
31. See note 22 and accompanying text supra.
32. See note 21 and accompanying text supra.
33. See Ohio Manufacturer's Ass'n Memorandum, supra note 22.
34. Id.
and 25 supra.
notes 15, 19,1981
SeeeCommons,
35. by
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without first being afforded the opportunity to show why such action

should not be taken.
B.

Due Process Considerationsin Administrative Adjudiciation

Assuming the director decides to proceed against a private individual on the basis of information acquired by the investigation, he
must respect certain procedural safeguards. If the OEPA action would
adversely affect a private interest protected by the due process clause

of the fourteenth amendment, 36 absent rare and extraordinary circumstances, 3 7 some form of notice and opportunity to be heard must
be afforded. 38 The due process clause does not necessitate a hearing in
advance of an order being drawn up, so long as an opportunity is given

for a meaningful hearing before that order becomes operative.39
The first issue presented, therefore, when the director determines

that a violation exists is whether the interest potentially affected by an
OEPA order is one considered to be "property" within the meaning of
the fourteenth amendment's due process clause. " To ascertain whether
due process applies, the "nature of the interest at stake" must be examined to determine whether it falls within the fourteenth
amendment's protection of "property.""' If so, the amendment requires notice and some form of opportunity to be heard prior to any
OEPA order becoming effective." 2
36. For a discussion of the private interests involved, see notes 67-71 and accompanying text infra.
37. For "rare and extraordinary situation" cases which have held that deprivation
of a protected interest need not be preceded by some kind of hearing, see Central
Union Trust v. Garvay, 254 U.S. 554 (1921) (Congress has power in wartime to provide for immediate seizure of property supposedly belonging to the enemy leaving the
question of enemy ownership to a later suit by claimant); Phillips v. Commission of Internal Revenue, 283 U.S. 589 (1931) (the United States may collect its internal revenue
by summary administrative proceedings if adequate opportunity is afforded for a later
determination of legal rights); Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc., 339 U.S. 594
(1950) (due process does not require a hearing in connection with seizures of misbranded
articles harmful or dangerous to health).
38. See Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535
(1971); Opp Cotton Mills v. Administrator, 312 U.S. 126 (1941); United States v. Illinois Cent. Ry. Co., 291 U.S. 457 (1934).
39. Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S.
564 (1972); Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
40. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972). Prior to Morrissey the applicability of due process was determined by balancing the state's interest in summary
action against the individual's claim for a hearing. E.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S.
254 (1970). In Morrisseythe Court stated that the proper focus is not on the weight of
the individual's interest but whether the nature of the interest is one within the meaning of the fourteenth amendment. 408 U.S. at 481.
41. See note 36 and accompanying text supra.
42. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972). See also Connell v. Higgenbotham, 403 U.S. 207 (1971); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970); Slockhower v.
Board of Higher Educ., 350 U.S. 551 (1956).
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol6/iss2/11
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Although there is no clear-cut definition, certain attributes of
"property" have emerged from a line of Supreme Court cases
interpreting the word. 3 There must be more than a desire or unilateral expectation to constitute "property." "A legitimate claim of entitlement" to a benefit is required, stemming from such independent
sources as state laws which support claims of entitlement to such
benefits." Such benefits as these are justifiably relied on by persons in
daily life, so that fairness requires the interest not be arbitrarily deprived." ' In regard to S.B. 284, the property interest affected by the
director's affirmative response to an alleged violation will usually be
monetary in nature."
In determining whether a hearing is required prior to an order
becoming effective, it is not sufficient that a constitutionally protected
interest be identified. The particular facts in dispute must also raise the
type of issues requiring a hearing. When the disputed facts involve
determination of policy or principles of general future application, a
hearing on those facts is generally not required. 4 7 The rationale is that
where a rule of conduct applies to a class of the public, it is impracticable that everyone affected should have a direct voice in its adoption." When, on the other hand, the disputed facts relate to past conduct of a particular individual or party, the general rule is that a hearing on those facts is required. 9 Although there is no clear-cut distinction between the two," resolution of verified complaints pursuant to
S.B. 284 will generally involve issues concerning which particular party
did what, when, how, and why. 5 Notice and opportunity to be heard
will therefore generally be necessary before an OEPA order becomes
operative against the individual.
C. Procedure under S.B. 284
Before considering the factors bearing on the constitutional sufficiency of procedures in S.B. 284, it is first necessary to detail the pro43.

See note 42 supra.
44. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972).
45. Id.
46. See note 63 and accompanying text infra.
47. Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441 (1915).
48. Id. at 445. Such disputed issues fit into Professor Kenneth Culp Davis'
category of "legislative facts." See 1 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 7.06
(1958) [hereinafter cited as Davis Treatise].
49. Londoner v. Denver, 210 U.S. 373 (1908). These issues are labeled "adjudicative facts" by Professor Davis. 1 Davis Treatise at § 7.02.
50. See 2 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 7.2 (2d ed. 1979)
[hereinafter cited as Davis Treatise 2d ed.].
51. See 1 Davis Treatise at § 7.02. Such issues involve "intrinsically the kind of
facts that ordinarily ought not to be determined without giving the parties a chance to
know and to meet any evidence that may be unfavorable to them." Id. at 413.
Published
by eCommons, 1981
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cedures afforded prior to any order becoming operative. Upon receipt
of a verified complaint, the director dispatches a district engineer who
is required to visit the site to determine whether the alleged violation
has occurred, is occuring, or will occur. 5 After the engineer concludes
his visit, a report is made and sent to the director in Columbus." If a
violation is found, the director may draw up an abatement order which
could conceivably require discontinuance of a particular operation.
There is no requirement that an opportunity be afforded the alleged
violator to challenge the evidence at a hearing before that order
becomes effective. 4 Senate Bill. 284 requires only that'the director give
the alleged violator notice of the charges and an opportunity to attend
an informative "conference," with the director or his delegate."
Although there is no legislative indication of precisely what procedures
are to be followed in the "conference," legislative history notes that
the principal purpose behind S.B. 284 was to eliminate the necessity of
a hearing. 56 The "conference" was, therefore, not intended to be a
hearing.
A de novo hearing is available on appeal to the Environmental
Board of Review; 7 however, the appeal is available only after an order
goes into effect.58 The OEPA relies on the bifurcated scheme of prior
52. Interview with OEPA Southwestern District Office Chief, supra note 18.
53. Id.
54. Ohio Manufacturers' Ass'n Memorandum, supra note 22.
55. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 3745.08(B) (Page Supp. 1980). OEPA Southwestern
District Office Chief Charles Forsthoff described the "conference" as an informal
proceeding where the alleged violator and the complainant are appraised of the determination and permitted to "ask questions." Interview with OEPA Southwestern
District Office Chief, supra note 18.
56. See notes 6-8 and accompanying text supra.
57. OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 3745.05 (Page Supp. 1980). The Environmental
Board of Review (EBR) is a three-man board which is separate and distinct from the
OEPA. The members are appointed by the Governor and submit their own budget to
the General Assembly. Each member is required to have extensive experience in pollution control and abatement technology, ecology, public health, environmental law,
economics of natural resource development or related fields. Id. § 3745.02.
58. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3745.05 (Page Supp. 1980); OHIo AD. CODE §
3746-5-13 (Baldwin 1980) (formerly EBR 3-10). Filing an appeal with the EBR does not
automatically suspend or stay execution of the OEPA order that is the subject of the
appeal. Upon application of the appellant, the EBR may suspend or stay execution of
the director's order pending immediate determination of the appeal without interruption by continuances for other than unavoidable reasons. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
3745.05 (Page Supp. 1980). In Broadway Christian Church v. Republic Steel Corp., 50
Ohio App. 2d 98, 361 N.E.2d 1090 (1976), the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County
stated in dicta that in deciding whether to grant a stay, the EBR must take into account
the distinction between a new proposed source of pollution and a presently operating
source, intimating that a stay of an order affecting a currently operating source will be
granted more easily. Id. at 103, 361 N.E.2d at 1094.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol6/iss2/11
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"conference" and subsequent de novo review by the EBR as adequately
affording an opportunity to be heard. Its reliance is placed on the case
of Kripke-Tuschman Industries v. Ned E. Williams, Director of Environmental Protection," before the Franklin County Court of Appeals. 6" The court held that due process was afforded equally well
whether a hearing was conducted initially before the OEPA or de novo
by the EBR.61 This holding is contrary to the United States Supreme
Court's mandate that procedural due process requires that there be a
meaningful opportunity to present one's case before governmental action adversely affects a protected interest. 6 2
One solution to this problem is to have the director enter a provisional order. A provisional order is one that will become finally
operative provided nobody takes timely steps to reopen it. 63 The
burden of going forward would then rest on the affected individual
rather than on the OEPA. The ex parte administrative determination
by the OEPA would become binding unless the individual seizes the
opportunity by demanding de novo hearing before the EBR.
Because the hearing required under prior law has been replaced by
a "conference," the constitutional adequacy of procedures in S.B. 284
will turn on how that "conference" is conducted in practice and the
subsequent interpretation by the courts of what minimal procedural
safeguards are required in this proceeding.
D.

The "Conference "

Because of the lack of specific provisions concerning the conference, the director presumably may establish his own criteria for the
goals and purpose of this proceeding. 6 ' Although given wide latitude
59. No. 78-AP-865 (Ct. App. Franklin Cbunty 1979). This case involved an appeal by the OEPA director from a decision of the EBR. The board had vacated the
director's order denying an application by Kripke-Tuschman for a permit to operate a
reverbatory furnace and ordered the director to reissue his order as a proposed action
so as to afford Kripke-Tuschman a hearing before the OEPA. Accord, Olin Corp. v.
James F. McAvoy, Director of Environmental Protection, No. 79-AP-377 (Q. App.
Franklin County 1979); General Motors Corp. v. James F. McAvoy, Director of Environmental Protection, No. 79-AP-53 (Ct. App. Franklin County 1979); Cincinnati

Gas & Elec. Co. v. Ira L. Whitman, Director Environmental Protection, No.

74-AP-151 (Ct. App. Franklin County 1974).
60. OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 3745.06 (Page 1980). This section provides: "any
person adversely affected by an order of the Environmental Board of Review may appeal to the Court of Appeals of Franklin County."
61. No. 78-AP-865 (Ct. App. Franklin County 1979).
62. See notes 35-38 and accompanying text supra.
63. W. GELLHORN & C. BYSE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW CASES AND COMMENTS, at
648 (6th ed. 1974).

64. See notes 55, 56, and accompanying text supra.
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by the General Assembly in this regard, the director is still bound by
due process considerations. The United States Supreme Court, in
Mathews v. Eldridge,"5 formulated a standard for evaluating the constitutional adequacy of administrative procedures. The Court noted
that the interests of the private individual must be balanced against the
governmental interests:
[O]ur prior decisions indicate that identification of the specific dictates of due process generally requires consideration of three
distinct factors: First, the private interest that will be affected by
the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of
such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value,
if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and
finally, the Government's interest, including the function involved
and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or
substitute procedural requirement would entail."
In order to analyze the types of safeguards that may be required
under Mathews it is necessary to examine the private and governmental
interests that must be accommodated by S.B. 284.
1.

Private Interests

According to Mathews the first consideration is the nature of the
private interest affected by the governmental action." 7 The interest affected by implementation of S.B. 284 procedures by the OEPA is often
likely to be a substantial property interest since actions authorized by
section 3745.08 of the Revised Code could require expenditure of
millions of dollars on the part of a private party to meet an abatement
order and conceivably the discontinuance of operation until that order
is met." 8
The second aspect of the private interest concern is the risk of erroneous deprivation of the property interest."9 In many instances the
risk of error under S.B. 284 could be high. Once the director draws up
an abatement order in response to alleged violations, there is no requirement that evidence gathered in the investigation 7 ' be compiled,
tested, and verified at a hearing prior to the order becoming
effective.
65. 424 U.S. 319 (1976). This case involved an appeal concerning the constitutional validity of procedures on termination of welfare benefits.
66. Id. at 334.
67. Id. at 335.
68. See Ohio Manufacturers' Ass'n Memorandum, supra note 22.
69. 424 U.S. at 335.
70. See notes 18-24 and accompanying text supra.
71. Ohio Manufacturers' Ass'n Memorandum, note 51 and accompanying text
supra.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol6/iss2/11
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A principle of administrative law is that a prior hearing may not be

required when testing, examination, or inspection is a better method
for ascertaining the facts."' When the testing or inspection technique 3
utilized in an investigation pursuant to S.B. 284 is objective and conclusory," rarely will a prior evidentiary hearing on that issue be useful
since the test is conclusive of a violation.7 5 Many of-the tests used to
ascertain pollution control law violations, however, are dependent
upon subjective application of the tests, as well as subjective analysis
of the data compiled."6 In these situations, unless the director grants

the procedural protection of a hearing, there is no opportunity to
challenge the test, the engineer's qualifications, or to propose alter-

native methods of testing or abatement. 77 In such circumstances, a
wide variety of information may be relevant and the issues of credibility
and veracity could be considered crucial to the decision-making process. 8 The affected party should be afforded an opportunity to
challenge such procedures since he is likely to be in the best position to

point out shortcomings.79
2.

Governmental Interest

The third element of the Mathews standard is an evaluation of the
state's interest in implementation of the procedure. 0 The state of
Ohio's interest under S.B. 284 is two-fold. First, there is a legitimate
interest in seeing that exposed pollution control violations are abated
as quickly as possible. 8 The OEPA asserts that full adjudicatory hear72. See, e.g., Board of Curators of the Univ. of Mo. v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78
(1978); Whitfield v. Illinois Bd. of Law Examiners, 504 F.2d 474 (7th Cir. 1974).
73. OHIo AD. CODE § 3745 (Baldwin 1980). This section details regulations administered by the OEPA regarding pollution control. Testing procedures to be used are
specified. For example, § 3745-1-03 provides that all methods used in analyzing water
quality standards shall be in accordance with 40 C.F.R., part 136, as amended, "Test
Procedures for Analysis of Pollutants."
74. Interview with Southwestern District Office Chief, supra note 18. Mr.
Forsthoff cited as an example, tests conducted to determine the concentration of certain chemical elements in water. Generally there can be no dispute as to findings concerning the concentration.
75. Id. See also 2 Davis Treatise 2d ed. at § 12:12.
76. Interview with Southwestern District Office Chief, supra note 18. As an example of subjectivity in testing, Mr. Forsthoff noted that often verified complaints of
foul odors are filed. When OEPA personnel are dispatched there is no conclusive test
to determine a violation, but rather a determination is made based on subjective
analysis.
77. See note 51 and accompanying text supra.
78. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 328 (1976).
79. W. GELLHORN, C. BYSE, & P. STRAUSS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW CASES AND
COMMENTS, at 686 (7th ed. 1979).
80. 424 U.S. at 335.
81. See notes 6 and 7 and accompanying text supra.
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ings have the adverse effect of allowing the pollution problem to go
unabated until the hearing is concluded. 8 2 A review of the United
States Supreme Court cases indicates that some type of imminent
threat is required before summary administrative action is appropriate.
In Fahey v. Mallonee,8 3 the Court upheld the action of a conservator
in taking possession of a bank without providing a prior hearing. The
Court held that, although this was a drastic procedure, the delicate
nature of a banking institution and the imminent threat of destruction
of credit made it constitutionally proper to apply supervisory power
prior to a hearing.8" In North America Cold Storage Co. v. Chicago,8 5
the Court upheld a statute permitting the summary seizure and
destruction of putrid chickens, holding that an administrative agency
may seize private property in situations involving imminent threats to
public health. 86 Verified complaints rarely involve such imminent
threats to human or environmental safety necessary to justify an ex
parte determination becoming operative prior to a hearing. 7 If such an
imminent threat were revealed, however, no statutory provision would
be necessary before immediate abatement is ordered. 8 8 The right to
take such summary action is based on the duty of the state to protect
and guard the lives and health of its citizens.8 9
Ohio has a second substantial public interest in the administrative
efficiency of the OEPA.9 ° This interest in efficiency would be impeded
by requiring an extensive hearing in every case in which a violation is
found, particularly since de novo review is available at the EBR level. 9
Because approximately ninety-five percent of all verified complaints
investigated are "false alarms," 9 roughly only five percent reach the
82. Id.
83. 332 U.S. 245 (1947).
84. Id. at 253.
85. 211 U.S. 306 (1908).
86. Id. at 315.
87. All but approximately five percent of investigated verified complaints are
dismissed as "false alarms." See notes 92 and 93 and accompanying text infra. Of the
remaining five percent, only one in 15 can be considered imminent threats to human
safety. Interview with Charles Forsthoff, OEPA Southwestern District Office Chief
(April 21, 1981).
88. 211 U.S. at 315.
89. Id.
90. See note 8 and accompanying text supra. See also Friendly, Some Kind of
Hearing, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 1267 (1975). "It should be realized that procedural requirements entail the expenditure of limited resources, that at some point the benefit to
individuals from an additional safeguard is substantially outweighed by the cost of
providing such protection .... " Id. at 1276.
91. See notes 57 and 58 and accompanying text supra.

92. See Interview with Southwestern District Office Chief, supra note 18.
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stage where some form of hearing is necessary."3 Of these few, some
may require more extensive hearings than others." In any event, providing adequate procedural safeguards to this limited number would
not seem to significantly infringe upon the state's interest in administrative efficiency.
3.

Balancing the Interests

Upon balancing the three factors formulated in Mathews, it is apparent that procedures dictated by S.B. 284 may not, in all circumstances, adequately take into account situations where the risk of erroneous deprivation of a substantial private interest outweighs the
state's interest in immediate abatement and administrative efficiency.
The opportunity to appear before the OEPA at a "conference" 95 may
not always provide satisfactory procedural due process safeguards.
This will particularly be true unless the director, on his own initiative,
establishes the safeguards the statute failed to supply.
Consideration of what procedures would better prevent the risk of
erroneous deprivation of a protected interest requires an evaluation of
the more important elements of "some kind of hearing."' 6 As Judge
Friendly notes, these elements should not be considered separately, but
rather, if the OEPA chooses to afford more of one procedural protection than constitutionally required, this may be a reason for
diminishing or even eliminating another. 7 First, it is fundamental that
timely, clear notice be given, sufficient to inform the affected party of
the proposed action and the grounds for the decision.' 8 This is essential to allow the party to acquire evidence to prepare his case so as to
benefit from any opportunity to be heard. 99
Another fundamental requirement is an opportunity to present
93.

Under S.B. 284, dismissal is required when no violation is found to exist.

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3745.08(B) (Page Supp. 1980). See note 31 and accompany-

ing text supra.
94. See notes 92 and 93 supra.
95. See notes 30, 52, 53, and accompanying text supra.
96. See Friendly, Some Kind of Hearing, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267 (1975)
[hereinafter cited as Friendly]. Judge Friendly suggested a second list of "various types
of government action that have been urged to call for a hearing, starting with the most
serious" such as revocation as distinguished from denial. "As we go down the second
list from the more severe actions to the less, the needle would point to fewer and fewer
requirements on the list of required safeguards." Id. at 1278.
97. See, e.g., Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971); Goldberg v. Kelley, 397
U.S. 254 (1970); Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
See also Friendly, supra note 96, at 1280.
98. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
99. Friendly, supra note 96, at 1281.
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reasons why the proposed action should not be taken.' 0 As noted
previously, the affected party is often in the best position to point out
deficiencies in the procedures used as the basis for a decision.' 0 ' The
big issue in S.B. 284 is what exact form should this opportunity take.
Should there be the right to call witnesses?' 2 Generally, there is no
reason to deny the opportunity to call a witness. The OEPA, however,
must be entitled to limit the number of witnesses and scope of examination.' 3 Similarly, the right to know the nature of the evidence
on which the director relies cannot be disputed.'" Should the opportunity to confront witnesses be given?" 5 When the OEPA relies on
evidence which is subjective in nature, it seems only fair that some opportunity be afforded to confront the people who gathered that evidence. 1 06 In such situations the identity of the witness and the content
of his testimony will generally have been disclosed, so there is no
reason not to allow at least limited cross-examination of that
witness.' 7 Finally, the party affected by an adverse order should be entitled to have any decision regarding the issuance of an operative order
based solely on evidence presented at the "conference."' 0 0 Outside
evidence concerning issues of general policy should be permissible,
provided the OEPA clearly indicates the basis for its decision.' 9 This
allows any erroneous findings to be challenged on appeal to the EBR
and the courts." ' The OEPA's consideration of these factors when
holding a conference, along with a de novo hearing on appeal to the
EBR, may create a bifurcated scheme which sufficiently guarantees
that due process is served.
In examining possible procedures to be implemented through the
"conference," it is important to note that procedural due process is
flexible and requires only the procedural protections a particular situation demands."' The required degree of procedural safeguards varies
100. Id.
101. See note 79 and accompanying text supra.
102. See Friendly, supra note 96, at 1282.
103. See generally, Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974) (unrestricted right to
call witnesses from among a prison population carries with it potential for disruption
and interference of the correctional program).
104. See Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474 (1959).
105. See Friendly, supra note 96, at 1286.
106. See note, 76, 77, and accompanying text supra.
107. See Friendly, supra note 96, at 1286.
108. Id. at 1287.
109. Id.
110. Challenging erroneous fact-findings on appeal requires that at least an informal record be compiled, even if it consists of only the director's notes. See Friendly,
supra note 96, at 1291.
111. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
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directly with the importance of the protected interest and the need for
a particular safeguard, weighed against the burden of affording it." 2
III.

CONCLUSION

With the enactment of S.B. 284, Ohio has amended its environmental protection verified complaint law. The bill clarifies procedures to be utilized in filing a complaint of alleged pollution control
law violation and its subsequent resolution once received by the
OEPA. Objections to S.B. 284 stem from the grant of broad discretion
to the director of the OEPA in acting upon verified complaints, particularly the change that the director is no longer required to conduct a
hearing prior to issuing an operative order. S.B. 284 requires only that
the alleged violator be afforded an opportunity to attend a "conference" with the director or his delegate.
Although S.B. 284 is not unconstitutional on its face, the constitutional adequacy of its procedures for affording an opportunity to be
heard will depend upon its application in practice as well as the courts'
subsequent interpretations of what safeguards are required in the
"conference" prior to any order becoming operative. In a particular
instance this will generally involve a balancing of competing interests
along with an evaluation of what additional procedures might better
prevent the risk of erroneous deprivation of a protected interest.
Daniel Anthony Bernardin
Code Section Affected: §3745.08
Effective Date: Aug. 7, 1980
Sponsor: Cox(S)
Committees: Agriculture, Conservation, & Environment (S)
Energy & Environment (H)
112. See Friendly, supra note 96. Judge Friendly enumerates eleven procedural
elements to be considered: (1) unbiased tribunal; (2) notice of the proposed action and
grounds asserted for it; (3) an opportunity to present reasons why the proposed action
should not be taken; (4) right to call witnesses; (5) right to know the evidence against
one; (6) right to have decision based only on the evidence presented; (7) counsel; (8)
the making of a record; (9) the statements of the reasons; (10) public attendance; and
(11) judicial review. This note has dealt briefly with only those elements considered
particularly essential to a fair disposition.
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